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ABSTRACT 
 
The peace-security-development nexus is present in development cooperation policies. The concept 
of security has changed since 9/11, consequently influencing the strategies proposed by 
development cooperation’s major aid donors. To study the relationship between development 
cooperation and security, José Antonio Sanahuja recently proposed an analytical framework for the 
securitization of aid, which is based on the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization. This 
author argues that cooperation for development policies have shifted depending on the need to 
support strategies to combat terrorism. This is affecting the strategies and priorities of these 
policies, mainly, to struggle against poverty, and to defend the democratic component. In the 
Central American case, security is a priority in the European Union’s new Regional Strategy Paper 
for 2014-2020. In this work, we will analyze and reflect on the EU’s role in development 
cooperation in Central America’s security strategy. We intend to demonstrate that indeed it is not a 
case of securitization of aid. Despite the EU’s recent focus on security in its Central American 
development cooperation, it does not respond to the elements presented by Sanahuja. 
 
Introduction 
 
The peace-security-development nexus is present in development cooperation policies. In many 
cases, after 9/11, development cooperation has started to be marked by the interests of donors, who 
based on their foreign policy, aim to fight against terrorism and search for national security. Not 
only does this affect the strategic development cooperation proposals of major aid donors —such as 
the European Union (EU)— but it questions many of the principles, values and methodologies that 
the Global Development Agenda (GDA) and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda (AEA) defined for 
international development cooperation policies to fight against poverty effectively. Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid professor, José Antonio Sanahuja, calls securitization of aid to this 
relationship between security and international development cooperation. He has proposed an 
analytical framework to study this link, which is based on the Copenhagen School’s concept of 
securitization. This author argues that securitization of aid is present in major donor’s cooperation 
policies, among which is the EU. 
 
In the Central American case, security emerged as the guiding principle for aid in the EU’s 2007-
2013 Regional Strategy period. It has been announced that it will once again be included in the 
EU’s new sub-regional development cooperation strategy 1  for Central America (2014-2020 
Regional Strategy Paper). In the 1980s, Central America overcame major conflicts stemming the 
dictatorship-revolution and Cold War dialectic. During that time, a great part of the aid directed 
towards the region was conditioned by the sub-regional conflict. In particular, aid from the United 
States or the Soviet Union, or each of their instrumental allies. Thus the EU and some of its 
member-states, in addition to Latin American countries like Mexico, played a very positive role in 
                                                        
1 The EU’s 2014-2020 Regional Strategy Paper for Central America has not officially been approved, but 
drafts are currently in circulation. In particular, for consultation processes with the Central American 
Integration System,  wich include the direct involvement of one of the authors. 
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helping to solve the conflict, distancing themselves from the interventionist logic, and supporting 
strategies for development and peace building. 
 
Nowadays, the Central American reality is once again marked by violence, but in this case, because 
of organized crime. Manifestations such as gang activity, drug and/or human trafficking and 
corruption in State structures, to name a few, are present in their most serious form. The sub-region 
ranks at the top for violent death per thousand inhabitants, and on the other hand, many cities or 
countries appear on the lists of the world’s most dangerous places. The cost of violence in Central 
America is 8% of its GDP (World Bank 2011). 
 
Within this framework of violence, security has become a central matter for the development 
cooperation agenda in Central American countries. All of Central America’s partners and friends 
focus their support now on security and on overcoming violence. These include the region’s 
traditional partners in cooperation at the bilateral —USA, Mexico, Colombia and Spain— and 
multilateral — EU, IDB, and World Bank— levels, in addition to the new or most recent allies, like 
Germany, Italy, Chile or Australia. The only exceptions for now are the new stakeholders in 
international cooperation like Japan, Taiwan or China. Next to the United States and Spain, the EU 
has been Central America’s most important cooperation partner in this recent period, particularly in 
the regional field linked to the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Central 
American Security Strategy. 
 
The hypothesis of this work is that despite the EU’s recent focalization on security in its Central 
American development cooperation, it has not securitized its aid, thus not  responding to Sanahuja’s 
definition or to the elements defined by the literature on the subject. The EU’s development 
cooperation in this sub-region has been outlined according to the GDA and the AEA, from a human 
security and peace building angle that incorporate the dimension of sustainable human 
development. 
 
Cooperation for Development and Security: the European Union and Latin America 
 
Since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the United Nations 
Millennium Summit in September 2000, the international development cooperation system, through 
the GDA and the AEA, has seen an important theoretical, conceptual, methodological and 
instrumental evolution for bilateral and multilateral development cooperation to more efficiently 
fight against poverty. International development cooperation can be conceptualized, then, as an 
international social public policy. And its aim is to search for the development of the aid recipients 
through their own leadership, while at the same time parting from and in direct coordination with 
their own development strategies. This transforms donors into stakeholders who support the 
development processes of the recipients who must be the protagonists of their own development. 
 
From the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness onwards (OECD 2005; 2008), among other 
points, the aim has been to make the decisions regarding international development cooperation 
interventions, which must be concentrated according to sector and geography, more objective. And 
in the principles of alignment, ownership and harmonization, accepted since the Declaration, this 
shift is evident. Also present is the intention of improving the quality of material and human 
resources used in actions, which results in a much more significant impact on the fight against 
poverty. These actions must be the result of a social policy that looks to permanently transform 
situations of poverty and vulnerability through the people living in these conditions by means such 
as defending their rights, providing them with abilities and creating opportunities for them. All this 
with active political, economic and social stakeholder participation —donors and recipients— in the 
form of local governments, universities, enterprises, and above all, civil society. When the United 
Nations proposes the concept of Sustainable Human Development (see Sotillo 2011: 23-83), this is 
what it is envisioning. 
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This logic of long-lasting transformation places aid for development in a clearly delineated space 
that must be created in situations of humanitarian emergency. Extraordinary action that responds to 
a specific cooperation modality, for example, where what is urgent quickly becomes what is 
important, such as the consequences of natural disasters, epidemics, or famine. However, the policy 
is perverted if this cooperation modality remains in time or is separated from these emergency 
situations and comes to occupy the space reserved for actions that aim towards the sustainable 
transformation of situations of poverty. Thus, what is urgent substitutes what is important without it 
being especially relevant. The transformative capacity of social policy is diminished, and suspicions 
that it might have been put into action by interests other than the genuine fight against poverty are 
incited; in local code, a social relief policy. Precisely, the GDA and the AEA try to avoid the 
overlapping of spaces that distort the international development cooperation policies and subtract 
from their efficacy. 
 
All this was promoted from the 1990s on, once the Cold War was over and the EU has actively been 
participating in both agendas. Under this umbrella there was also a different linkage between peace, 
security and development, where the objective of promoting development was not subordinated to 
security, but vice-versa. This spawned the concept of human security that —along with what has 
been previously stated— is countered against the classic concept of security. In the international 
development cooperation strategies, security is a sector that, like others, is functional to the general 
objective of the fight against poverty. The same as with other donors, in the post-Cold War period, 
as a donor the EU is situated with certain ambiguity between the concepts of human security and 
classical security (Sotillo 2011: 23-83). The EU is “like stakeholders who have tried to develop a 
comprehensive or broadened focus of security that includes human security in addition to other 
more classical conceptions … maintaining peace, preventing conflict, and strengthening 
international security” (Sanahuja 2012: 33). 
 
The above starts to change after 9/11 when the so-called Global War Against Terror once again 
highlighted the donor’s concern about its national security in a return to the earlier classical 
conception, previous to the UN Millennium Summit and the MDGs. “The concept of securitization 
is about an analytical focus or tool that examines how certain matters are transformed or framed by 
certain stakeholders, determined as a security problem or issue” (Sanahuja 2012: 19). 
 
Under this logic, financial development aid is part of the weaponry against international terrorism. 
In this case, the Copenhagen School’s normative focus of securitization —on which Sanahuja is 
based and in which the EU participates— seems to distance the current international development 
cooperation policies from what is its genuine interest in fighting against poverty. This is because 
they have remained subordinated to the imperatives of anti-terrorism and the donor’s national 
security. The cooperation actions move to the terrain of what is extraordinary or emergency, in the 
same way that social policy becomes assistance-based. According to Copenhagen School authors2, 
“when a matter is securitized or tagged as security, it is linked to a fact that is defined or redefined 
as an existential threat. With this, it is elevated to the category of emergency and it is given a sense 
of urgency and relevance that legitimizes the unfolding of extraordinary means to face this threat, 
including the breakdown of established norms” (Sanahuja 2012: 19). 
 
Sanahuja maintains that this process is what would be considered securitization of aid, because “the 
redefinition of concepts and political frameworks can be observed through a diversity of dynamics 
that include the discursive logics that legitimize development aid, such as the mobilization of 
extraordinary resources, the changes in the guidelines used to assign aid, the redefinition of 
democratic governance based on security, and some growing difficulties for determined aid 
                                                        
2 Specifically, Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. 1993. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, cited by Sanahuja 2012. 
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modalities and for the non-governmental stakeholders” (Sanahuja 2012: 18). Furthermore, for these 
same Copenhagen School authors, securitization studies what is important and what is a threat, for 
whom (the reference objects) and for what reason this is done. These same key questions, when 
applied to development cooperation policy, allow us to observe if a case of securitization of aid is at 
hand. According to this analytical framework, securitization in this case will be related to policies 
and actions promoted by donors according to their interests, where aid recipients are reference 
objects. The reason for the policy or action is to guarantee the security interests of the donors, who 
consider their security under threat. 
 
Central America’s Security Strategy 
 
It has been almost 30 years since the Esquipulas Peace Process was held. Central American 
countries are now assessing the contributions by this process to development in the sub-region. The 
negotiation around the sub-regional conflict favored the definition of Central American 
development principles. Signing of the Esquipulas Peace Agreement in 1987 by five Central 
American countries constituted the region’s commitment to peace, but also to development. It also 
opened a process towards the Central American democratic transition. This created an environment 
of optimism that led to think in significant progress for the region’s political and economic 
development. However, the revolutionary processes that detonated conflict did not bring about 
revolutionary change in the region’s political and economic structures (Sánchez-Ancochea, Martín 
2014) 
 
The Central American Integration System (SICA) has been one of the instruments that the Central 
American countries defined in Esquipulas in order to respond to the threats to their development. 
Despite its weaknesses, Central American integration is probably the most dynamic of Latin 
America’s classical processes (Caldentey 2014). In need still of exploiting their potential, the 
region’s stakeholders and partners outside of SICA are observing their possibilities as a 
complementary but necessary framework for development policy. In recent years there has been 
numerous incorporation of countries to SICA as observer states, among which is the United States, 
unthinkable 10 years ago. 
 
In 1995, the Central American countries finished the construction of SICA’s legal framework, 
signing the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (FTDS). It was very well received because it 
was the first instrument to separate a police task dedicated to the security of goods and people from 
the armed forces, whose field of action was limited to the defense of national sovereignty. In order 
to comply with this mission, the Central American Security Commission is still integrated by the 
vice-ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Public Security, or the Interior. The institutionality 
of democratic security in the region is completed by other instances such as the Commission of 
Chiefs and Directors of Central American Police, the Council on the Prosecutor’s Offices in the 
Region, the Conference on Central America’s Armed Forces; the Regional Commission for Social 
Prevention of Violence; the Central American Legal Council, or the Permanent Central American 
Commission for the Eradication of the Production, Trafficking, Consumption and Illegal Use of 
Narcotics and Psychoactive Substances. 
 
Because of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, security made a forceful reappearance in 
the region’s agenda. But above all, it was because internally, Costa Rica proposed to reform the 
FTDS. Alongside Panama, they had signed the treaty with expressed reservations regarding some 
sections, and had not yet ratified it. An extraordinary Presidents Meeting in October 2006, in 
Bosques de Zambrano (Honduras), lead to the activation of this new stage in the region’s security 
agenda. Central America’s Security Strategy was born, then, in 2007 with the FTDS in revision and 
Mexico and the US’s bilateral Merida Initiative in place. 
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The return of violence is now Central America’s main regional feature. In addition to social and 
institutional breakdown, violence and organized crime are creating suffering, and the Central 
American citizens have been subjected to their consequences. At the same time, the sub-region also 
faces the effects of the governmental pressure against organized crime in Colombia and Mexico, 
and its expanding effect towards Central America. It is now a zone for operations for these groups, 
not only a transit area between the markets of greatest production and greatest demand (World Bank 
2011). 
 
The Central American governments came to the conclusion that their tools are insufficient to face 
the inexhaustible resources and destabilizing abilities of their powerful enemy, organized crime. So, 
the need for countries in the sub-region to join efforts became evident, as well as for the 
international community to accept its responsibilities and support the Central American countries. 
In this context, the International Conference in Support of Central America’s Security Strategy was 
organized in order to review the Strategy adopted in 2007. It involved all sectors of society in close 
collaboration with international cooperation, partner countries and multilateral institutions. This 
allowed the Central American Security Commission to adopt the Central American Security 
Strategy in 2011. Security has since then occupied a greater space in the sub-regional agenda than 
other priorities like economic integration, social integration, disaster prevention and climate change 
(SGSICA 2011). 
 
With the international community’s support, the Central American countries agreed to work around 
four principles: the international community’s co-responsibility in the problem; the regionality that 
demands the construction of a framework for articulated regional initiatives that respond coherent 
and efficiently to those developed in each country; the firm ownership of the Strategy by the Central 
American countries; and the additionally of the resources offered by cooperation during the process. 
The conference favored the development of a portfolio of 22 regional projects and initiatives around 
these four priorities: a) Law Enforcement, b) Violence Prevention, c) Rehabilitation, Reintegration 
and Prison Management, and d) Institutional Strengthening (SGSICA 2011). 
 
The more than 100 delegations of countries and multilateral organizations that participated in the 
2011 Conference, committed their support to the complete portfolio and translated some generic 
offers to be funded, totaling more than two billion US dollars. As usually happens in these types of 
forums, the concretion of aid has been much smaller, and the effective commitments have not gone 
above 100 million US dollars (SGSICA 2013). Moreover, the Conference ignited two very 
interesting processes for the debates on development, security, integration and cooperation. On the 
one hand, it encouraged Central American countries to define a strategy that truly articulated 
national and regional policies and interventions. On the other, it constituted an alignment, 
ownership and harmonization process for donors that have had the group of friends as a determining 
instance in the Strategy’s execution. 
 
The EU’s Development Aid in Central America: a Case of Aid Securitization? 
 
Security has become an important sector in the EU’s cooperation with Central America since 2007. 
In the previous multiannual regional cooperation budget for 2007-2013, the EU dedicated 23 
million euros to security and justice, focused on three complementary components —support to 
police and forensic institutions, strengthening of justice systems, and support of social cohesion 
through prevention activities dedicated in particular to youth. For the 2014-2020 budget plans, in a 
total 120 million euro sub-regional budget, the numbers have increased to 40 million euros for the 
priority sector that addresses the security-development nexus. In the current program of the EU’s 
cooperation with Central America, this sector is called security and the rule of law, and there are 
two more priority sectors: regional economic integration and climate change and disaster. In 
planning for future years, the EU envisages to continue aggressively promoting a comprehensive 
and balanced approach to security issues in Central America. This will be implemented in a 
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context of several challenges that need to be addressed by Central American institutions, like 
criminal violence that results from drug trafficking, and organized crime groups that are reinforced 
by the lack of comprehensive policies and the scarcity of decent job opportunities (European 
Commission 2014). 
 
We once again take up Sanahuja’s systematization (2012: 28-32), which is based on the analytical 
framework provided by Balzacq in order to understand securitization (2005) and to appraise if the 
increase in the EU’s cooperation for security with Central American countries responds to the sub-
region’s securitization tendencies. For comparison purposes, we will mention how these categories 
are in development in the Central American relationship with other partners, in particular the United 
States. 
 
a) As far as the return to national security as a justification for foreign aid and guiding 
principle for the cooperation narrative and rhetoric, it is true that following the Lisboa 
Treaty, the EU has established links between security, foreign policy and development 
cooperation. However, the bases for violence in Central America and their connection to 
organized crime do not have a direct effect on their security, which is why they are not 
arguments that support cooperation. In the Unites States, for example, it is possible that the 
argument for national security supports its cooperation with Central America. It is not this 
work’s objective, but the positions of the US Department of State and US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), would be an interesting object of study, to 
differentiate between Hillary Clinton’s tenure and her immediate predecessor and 
successor. 
b) As far as the redefinition of peace and human security building in a framework of 
prevention and fight against terrorism, and for post-war stability, the EU’s relationship 
with Central America is based on pre- 9/11 interpretations. Evidence that this is the case 
can be found in the selection of topics that have been supported by the EU for the portfolio 
projects. The background of the EU’s cooperation with SICA, as well as the decision to 
center on interventions focused on institutional strengthening and the prevention of 
violence, does not suggest a subordination of programs and their logic of fighting against 
terror. 
c) As far as the mobilization of extraordinary resources, we can confirm that the EU has 
increased bilateral and regional funds towards Central America. As we have previously 
mentioned, in the current 2014-2020 regional program, 40 million euros are directed to 
Security and the Rule of Law programs, which means an increase of 17 million euros 
compared to the previous period, and places this sector as first priority. The reason for these 
increases in regional cooperation is twofold (Caldentey 2014). First, SICA’s increasing 
relevance as an area for development policies and cooperation programs, and second, the 
dynamic surrounding the violence crisis and the 2011 International Conference. 
d) As far as the changes in geographic priorities, the threat of organized crime and the effects 
of violence and instability have placed Central America on the agenda once again, despite 
the tendency to reduce Latina American cooperation funds. Manifestations of the Central 
American crisis, like those related to violence against Central American migrants in their 
transit through Mexico, or the large numbers of unaccompanied migrant minors attempting 
to enter the US, have been added to previous episodes of political instability. For example, 
the coup d’état in Honduras or the concern about the alliance of some governments with the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America (ALBA), and in particular with 
Venezuela. Central America is back in the cooperation priorities, then, despite the fact that 
its small size will never allow its presence in absolute cooperation volume rankings. 
e) The cornering of democratization, human rights and good government agenda does not 
seem to directly influence the EU’s cooperation with Central America. However, the weight 
of these traditional objectives present between these two regions loses relevance in the new 
cooperation framework. There are not, at least in the area of regional cooperation, clauses 
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or agreements that define the EU’s new conditionalities centered on security. The recent 
agreement between the EU and Central America —whose pillars are political dialogue and 
cooperation— is still pending European ratification, is also an area for analysis of the 
tendencies that this category points to in the securitization process. 
f) None of the Central American countries respond to the category of Fragile States, but the 
vulnerabilities of same of them (especially the Northern Triangle: El Salvador, Honduras 
and Guatemala) highlight that the aid is conditioned by security, that would point to the 
securitization of aid in Central America from the main donors, including the EU. However, 
this does not close the door to security viewed from a mostly developmental approach 
(human security). 
g) There are no signs in Central America that humanitarian aid is subject to a growing 
politization and militarization. The effects of violence in Central America today do not 
demand humanitarian aid, but more complex responses. 
h) The redefinition of the securitized development agenda as key is particularly noted in 
proposals regarding Central American migration to the US. In particular, these focuses 
affect US cooperation more than EU cooperation, which is less concerned by this problem. 
i) There still is no evidence that allows affirming the existence of actions directed towards 
control and reduction of autonomy for civil society organizations. However, civil society’s 
options to participate in the management or design of development cooperation policies 
against insecurity are limited by the traditional distrust in them by Central American states 
(Tager 2012). Nevertheless, civil society does not have an intermediary role between the 
states and violence generators. Organized crime does not offer options in the matter, except 
perhaps in some related episode concerning the gangs in El Salvador and in other countries. 
The only conflict that is produced between civil society and government regarding this 
crisis is the dialectic between repression and prevention. Some civil society organizations 
insist on abandoning repression or crackdown strategies that have been implemented, 
especially in the Northern Triangle countries. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The securitization of aid is a consolidated phenomenon among development cooperation’s most 
recent tendencies since 9/11. Although this phenomenon’s levels of intensity vary according to each 
donor, it is still apparent in the EU. When the main donors securitize aid, the key implication for 
Latin America is that the aid becomes an additional factor in the reduction of cooperation flows to 
the region. Currently, its geographical distance from those conflicts closely related to the war 
against terrorism, places the region as a secondary stakeholder. 
 
In anachronistic terms, in the 1980s, the Central American countries could be an example of the 
securitization of aid, when the Cold War was infused into its national and regional conflicts. 
Presently, the sub-region is a special case, given the effects of violence provoked by organized 
crime and drug trafficking; especially in the Northern Triangle countries. After the 2011 
International Conference, which supported the Central American Security Strategy, security and 
overcoming violence and impunity in organized crime are now the main focus of Central American 
international development cooperation. The Conference was a very important moment for 
development cooperation policies. It offered a relevant exercise, in light of AEA, that has allowed 
donors to align to and harmonize with the sub-regional strategy. And so the Central American 
countries, as an integrated group of countries, exercise effective leadership (ownership). 
 
Particularly, in Central America, the EU has concentrated its development cooperation on the 
severe problems of insecurity and violence that are a direct consequence of organized crime and its 
resulting activities. Using the analytical tools offered by Sanahuja, based on the Copenhagen 
School, the analysis presented in this work has enough elements to conclude that the EU’s Central 
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American development cooperation is not a particular securitization of aid example. These elements 
are: 
 
a) The type of insecurity suffered in the sub-region is not linked to terrorism but to organized 
crime; 
b) The consequences of this type of insecurity do not affect the EU. They do affect the Central 
American countries, places that are as dangerous as current  battlefields or zones in conflict.  
For Mexico and the United States —as areas of transit or destination for migrants and 
drugs— the situation is different, however. Insecurity could have a significant effect on 
these countries through the direct exercise of violence in the form of exploitation, human 
trafficking and murder of north-bound migrants, in addition to the indirect exercise of 
violence over all the sub-region’s inhabitants. 
c) The Central American countries are not relevant as sub-regional development cooperation 
partners, nor in the ongoing cooperation programs that are part of the overall international 
development cooperation system, especially when compared to other countries such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, Syria or Libya, for example. 
d) The EU’s focus on these matters, that despite having opted for a normative approach to 
security, is still linked to security issues. The aid for development that the EU offers 
towards security and the rule of law is still subordinated to the goal of fighting poverty with 
a focus on sustainable human development, and is governed by the AEA principles. That is, 
development cooperation in security prevailing under the UN’s conception of human 
security. 
 
The relevance of the security crisis in Central America is without question, as is its direct impact on 
the United States and other nearby countries. The destabilizing effect of organized crime is tipping 
several of the sub-region’s countries to become fragile states. Their vulnerable rule of law is unable 
to face the effects of insecurity, resulting in tragic consequences for its citizens, with even more 
severe security implications for their neighboring countries. Therefore, at present, the EU’s Central 
American development cooperation, with its particular focus on security as per the 2014-2020 
strategy, is more an example of human security than of securitization of aid. 
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